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HEALING V. JONES: MANDATE FOR
ANOTHER TRAIL OF TEARS?
RIcHARD SCHIFTER*
W. RICHARD WEST, JR.**
I. THE ALLEGED MANDATE
On May 29, 1974, the House of Representatives, sitting in Com-
mittee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, considered
amendments to a bill, H.R. 10337, "[T]o authorize the partition
of the surface rights in the joint use area of the 1882 Executive
Order Hopi Reservation and the surface and subsurface rights in
the 1934 Navajo Reservation. . .".1 As the House was about to
vote on an amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by
Mr. Meeds, Mr. Owens, the sponsor of H.R. 10337, rose to deliver
a fervent appeal to his colleagues to stand by the law by defeating
the amendment:
[I] appeal to the Members of the Committee: Do not over-
rule the Supreme Court in a matter where you do not under-
stand the sensitivities and the equities. . . . [L]et us uphold
the Supreme Court. Let us leave this matter in the hands of
the courts by defeating the Meeds amendment. 2
The House did what Mr. Owens had requested. It voted down
the Meeds substitute and passed H.R. 10337 in the form supported
by Mr. Owens. s But as the bill moved on to the Senate, a number
of legal questions continued to be raised: Was enactment of the
bill really required in order "to uphold the Supreme Court"? Would
Congress, by approving an amendment such as that offered by
Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Karnpelman (Wash. D.C.); LL.B., 1951, Yale Uni-
versity.
** Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Kampelman (Wash. D.C.) ; J.D., 1971, Stanford Uni-
versity. The authors' firm represents the Navajo Tribe before the Congress.
1. H.R. Res. 1095, 98d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
2. 120 CoNe. Rc. H4519 (daily ed. May 29, 1974) (remarks of Congressman Wayne
Owens).
3. 120 CoNG. Ruc. H4519-20 (daily ed. May 29, 1974).
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Congressman Meeds, really "overrule" the Court? Beyond that,
did the legislative proposal authored by Congressman Owens meet
the test of constitutionality? The answer to each of these questions,
in the view of the Navajo Tribe, is "no."
The decision of the Supreme Court, of which Congressman Owens
was speaking was, to say the least, one of its less momentous
pronouncements. It was the summary affirmance of a lower court
decision, contained in a per curiam order filed on June 3, 1963.
That order read in relevant part:
The motion to affirm . . . is granted and the judgment
is affirmed.
Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that probable jurisdic-
tion should be noted and would decide the cases only after
argument.4
It is, therefore, to the opinion of the lower court in the case
here in issue that we must look if we are to find the answers
to the questions posed above. In the case styled Healing v. Jones,
a three-judge Federal District Court had decided in 1962 the respec-
tive interests of the Navajo Tribe and the Hopi Tribe in a tract
of approximately 2,453,000 acres located in northeastern Arizona.5
Some observers have referred to the case and its aftermath as
the largest quiet-title action in the West.6 But the Navajos have
not viewed the matter as a real estate transaction. They have
been fearful that it will result in the mass expulsion of thousands 7
of Navajo Indians from their homes, reminiscent of the "Long Walk"
of the Navajos of 1864, one of the most tragic events of Navajo
history, of which every Navajo child learns from his ancestors.,
The action in Healing v. Jones was initiated following the enact-
ment in 1958 of Public Law 85-547,8 a which conferred jurisdiction
4. Jones v. Healing, 373 U.S. 758 (1963).
5. Healing v. Jones, 210 F. Supp. 125 (D. Ariz. 1962), aff'd, 373 U.S. 758 (1963).
6. See, e.g., 120 CONG. REC. H4503 (daily ed. May 29, 1974).
7. See Hearings on H.R. 5647, H.R. 7679, and H.R. 7716 Before the Subcomm. on Indian
Affairs of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 62
(1973). (Statement of the Chairman of the Navajo Tribal Council).
8. In early 1864 the United States Army interned thousands of Navajos and then re-
moved them by force to military installations in what is now the State of New Mexico. The
removal resulted in the deaths of hundreds of the captive Navajos, and always has been
referred to by Navajos as the Long Walk. See generally D. BROWN, BURY My HEART AT
WOUNDED KNEE 27-29 (1970).
8a. The Act of July 22, 1958, was the jurisdictional statute for the District Court, and
contained the following provisions:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That lands described in the Execu-
tive Order dated December 16, 1882, are hereby declared to be held by the
United States in trust for the Hopi Indians and such other Indians, if any, as
heretofore have been settled thereon by the Secretary of the Interior pursuant
to such Executive Order. The Navajo Indian Tribe and the Hopi Indian Tribe,
acting through the chairmen of their respective tribal councils for and on, be-
half of said tribes, including all villages and clans thereof, and on behalf of
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on the United States District Court for the District of Arizona to
determine the respective rights and interests of the two Tribes
or any other tribe of Indians in the area "set aside by Executive
Order dated December 16, 1882". The Act further provided that
the Executive Order Area was henceforth to be held by the United
States in trust for the Indians having an interest in the land. Any
portion in which the Navajo Indians were determined to have an
exclusive interest was to be added to the Navajo Reservation and
any land in which the Hopis were determined to have an exclusive
interest was to be added to the Hopi Reservation.9 The Congress
struck from the bill a provision which would have authorized the
disposition of land in which both Tribes were held to have a joint
interest.10
The area of land with which the court was to deal under the
provisions of Public Law 85-547 was a large rectangular tract set
aside by President Arthur on December 16, 1882, "for the use and
occupancy of the Moqui, and such other Indians as the Secretary
of the Interior may see fit to settle thereon."" There was no doubt
that in 1882 some Navajos were residing within that area, in addition
to the Moqui (now generally known as Hopis).12 Navajos have lived
on that land ever since, multiplying at a more rapid rate than
any Navajo or -oni Indians claiming an interest in the area set aside by
Executive Order dated December 16, 1882, and the Attorney General on behalf
of the United States, are each hereby authorized to commence or defend In the
United States District Court for the District of Arizona an action against
each other and any other tribe of Indians claiming any interest in or to the
area described in such Executive Order for the purpose of determining the
rights and interests of said parties In and to said lands and quieting title
thereto in the tribes or Indians establishing such claims pursuant to such
Executive Order as may be just and fair in law and equity. The action shall
be heard and determined by a district court of three judges in accordance with
the provisions of title 28 United States Code, section 2284, and any party may
appeal directly to the Supreme Court from the final determination by such
three judge district court.
SEC. 2. Lands, if any, in which the Navajo Indian Tribe or Individual
Navajo Indians are determined by the court t6 have the exclusive interest
shall thereafter be a part of the Navajo Indian Reservation. Lands, if any,
in which the Hopi Indian Tribe, including any Hopi village or clan thereof,
or individual Hopi Indians are dltermined by the court to have the exclusive
interest shall thereafter be a reservation for the Hopi Indian Tribe. The Nava-
Jo and Hopi Tribes, respectively, are authorized to sell, buy, or exchange any
lands within their reservations, with the approval of the Secretary of the In-
terior, and any such lands acquired by either tribe through purchase or ex-
change shall become a part of the reservation of such tribe.
SEC. 3. Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to be a congressional deter-
mination of the merits of the conflicting tribal or individual Indian claims
to the lands that are subject to adjudication pursuant to this Act, or to
affect the liability of the United States, if any, under litigation now pending
before the Indian Claims Commission.
Approved July 22, 1958.
Act of July 22, 1958, 72 Stat. 403.
9. Id. § 2.
10. See generally S. REP. No. 265, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1957) ; H.R. REP. No. 1942,
85th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1958) ; Letter from Hatfield Chilson to James A. Haley, quoted in
S. REP. 265, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
11. Executive Order of December 16, 1958, quoted in C. KAPPLER, LAWS AND TREATIES
805 (1904).
12. 210 F. SupP. at 145.
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the Hopis.18 The controversy between the two Tribes was what
relative rights they had to the land. At the time of enactment
of Public Law 85-547 in 1958, the Hopis contended that the Navajos
had never been "settled" on the Executive Order Area and that
the Hopis, therefore, had exclusive rights of use and occupancy
to the entire tract of about 2,453,000 acres. 14 The Navajos, on the
other hand, contended that they had indeed been "settled" within
the meaning of the 1882 Executive Order and had exclusive rights
to that portion of the land which the Bureau of Indian Affairs
had assigned to Navajo use in 1943, consisting of approximately
1,822,000 acres. The Navajo Tribe conceded that the Hopis had exclu-
sive rights to the land which the Bureau of Indian Affairs had
set aside for Hopi use in 1943, approximately 631,000 acres.15
Thus, the 631,000 acres which the Bureau of Indian Affairs had
set aside for Hopi use were not in controversy. What was in contro-
versy.was the area of 1,822,000 acres which the Navajos were using,
almost exclusively. Both the Navajo Tribe and the Hopi Tribe claimed
exclusive rights and interests to that area.
The lengthy opinion rendered by the District Court reached, in
essence, the following conclusions:
(1) The 1882 Executive Order vested in the Indians a mere right
to use and occupancy which could "be terminated by the unilateral
action of the United States without legal 'liability for compensation." 16
(2) A constitutionally protected right to the land did not vest in
the Indians until 1958, when the language of Public Law 85-547,
for the first time, created that right.J
(3) The Navajo Indians were "settled" on the tract by the Secretary
of the Interior, within the meaning of the phrase in the Executive
Order, in 1931.18 This settlement gave them a right of use and
occupancy in the area reserved for them by the Bureau of Indian
Affairs, an area of 1,822,000 acres. Under the 1958 law, this right
of use and occupancy, derived from the settlement, ripened into
a constitutionally protected vested right.19
(4) The Hopis derived a pre-1958 right of use and occupancy of
the 1,822,000 acres from the fact that they were explicity mentioned
in the 1882 Executive Order.20 The settlement of the Navajos and
the exclusion of the Hopis from the area by officials of the Bureau
13. Id. at 168-70
14. Id. at 170-92.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 188.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 156-57.
19. Id. at 138.
20. Id. at 184.
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of Indian Affairs did not terminate the continued rights of the Hopis
to the area.2 1 These rights, too, ripened into a constitutionally pro-
tected right in 1958.22
(5) The rights which thus vested in 1958 to the 1,822,000 acres
belonged to the two Tribes. They were joint rights. They were
undivided. And they were also equal.2 3
(6) The Hopis had an exclusive uncontested right of use and occu-
pancy in the 631,000 acres set aside for them in 1943, which had
also become a vested right in 1958. Under the provision of Public
Law 85-547, the tract was, therefore, partitioned and the 631,000
acres set aside as the Hopi Reservation. 24
Having decided that the two Tribes had joint rights to the
1,822,000 acres (hereinafter referred to as "the joint-interest area"),
and not being empowered by Congress to allocate the rights to
partition the land, the Court simply left the two Tribes with this
decision in the nature of a declaratory judgment. But the land
in which, according to the Healing court, the Hopis had had since
1958 a vested one-half interest was occupied almost completely by
Navajos, had been so occupied in 1958, and for decades before.
In the years that followed there was no difficulty delivering
to the Hopis a share of the income derived from mining operations
on the tract owned jointly by the two Tribes. But what to do with
the surface, on which Navajos resided and on which Navajo livestock
grazed, became an increasingly vexing problem. During the twelve
years which have elapsed since the Supreme Court affirmed Healing
v. Jones, efforts to resolve the differences between the Tribes over
the use of the surface of the joint-interest area have failed. The
Navajos, whose people depend on the grazing resources of that
land, had wanted to remain in possession of the surface and to
recognize the property rights of the Hopis in some way other than
delivering to the Hopis one half of the surface, or 911,000 acres.
The Hopis, on the other hand, have insisted that they be given
a contiguous block of 911,000 acres adjacent to their Reservation,
and that the Navajo people now residing on that land be expelled.
In light of the fact that negotiations between the parties did
not produce a satisfactory result, the Hopis have taken their case
both to the courts and the Congress. On March 13, 1970, the Hopi
Tribe petitioned the District Court of Arizona for a writ of assistance
which would enable the Hopis to make use of fifty per cent of
the surface area in the joint-interest area.2 5 On October 14, 1972,
21. Id. at 189.
22. Id. at 138.
23. Id. at 189.
24. Id. at 173.
25. Hamilton v. Nakai, 453 F.2d 152 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 945 (1972).
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the District Court of Arizona issued a writ of assistance which
directed the Navajo Tribe to commence a program of livestock
reduction in order to allow members of the Hopi Tribe to use
more of the surface of the joint-interest area. 2 In the Congress,
members of the House and Senate favorable to the Hopi position
introduced bills which would partition the joint-interest area by con-
veying half of the surface to each of the Tribes and expelling
Navajos from the area conveyed to the Hopis.27 Both the judicial
and the legislative solution would make room for Hopi livestock
in the joint-interest area. But whereas the former would do so
without forcing Navajos to give up their homes and 'leave the area,
the legislative solution advocated by the Hopis would indeed entail
the expulsion of Navajos from their homes. It is that aspect of
the matter which caused the Navajos to oppose the Hopi-supported
legislative solution with all the resources which they could muster.
The Navajos desperately want to avoid another Long Walk, another
Trail of Tears, for thousands of their fellow tribesmen. Their struggle
against expulsion -legislation has been the most controversial Indian
issue before both the 92nd and the 93rd Congress. 28
II. THE PLENARY POWERS OF THE CONGRESS
The essential elements of the Hopi-sponsored legislative solution
are (1) that the subsurface remain joint, undivided and equal, (2)
that only the surface rights be partitioned between the two Tribes
and that such partitioning must result in acreage equal in size
and carrying capacity being allocated to the two parties, and (3)
that the acreage so allocated be a contiguous block of land adjacent
to the Hopi Reservation, from which all Navajos are to be expelled.2 9
This solution, the territorial solution, its sponsors have argued, is
the only legally proper legislative sequel to Healing v. Jones. That
26. Hamilton v. McDonald, No. Civ. 579 Pct. (D. Ariz. 1972).
27. See S. 2424, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) ; H.R. 10337, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1973).
28. On July 26, 1972, H.R. 11128, a Navajo expulsion bill supported by the Hopi Tribe,
passed the House of Representatives. See H.R. 11128, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). The
Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs held hearings on the bill in September,
1972, but then failed to report the bill out of Committee. A similar bill, H.R. 10337, came
to the floor of the House of Representatives in the next Congress. See H.R. 10337, 93rd
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). H-.R. 10337 was defeated on March 18, 1974, under suspension of
the rules, but passed under a rule on May 29, 1974. The Senate Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs approved a substantially different bill on August 21, 1974.
29. In the joint-interest area, it must be remembered, there live about 2,000 Navajo fami-
lies. Their residential sites, with all appurtenances, do not occupy more than ten acres of
land. They thus occupy residentially, at most, 20,000 acres. If it were indeed decided that
911,000 acres out of 1,822,000 acres must be partitioned to the Hopis, wobld it not be pos-
sible to allocate acreage in such manner as to save the not more than 20,000 acres of resi-
dential sites? Yet this possibility is negated by the requirement in the Hopi-supported bills
that the area partitioned to the Hopis must be a contiguous, compact block of land adjacent
to the Hopi Reservation, from which Navajo residents would be removed. The emphasis on
this last point suggests that the legislation is not concerned merely with a partitioning of
economic interests but with the territorial aggrandizement of the Hopi Reservation. See
H.R. 11128, 92d Cong., 2d Seas. (1972).
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such is simply not so becomes evident from a mere reading of
the Healing case. The jurisdictional act had authorized the court
to partition and award to the appropriate tribe any land within
the Executive Order Reservation which it found to be owned exclu-
sively by that Tribe. But while the original draft of the bill would
have allowed the court also to partition land which it found to
be jointly-owned, the final version did not. As the court pointed
out:
But then it was decided to delete the provision which would
give the court power to distribute jointly-held land. This was
accomplished by amending the bill to strike the third num-
bered clause contained in the above-quoted part of section 2
of the bill. The request for this revision came from the de-
partment, in a 'letter from Chilson to Honorable James A.
Haley, Chairman of the subcommittee. The reason given for
this deletion was as follows:
[T] he purpose is to leave for future determination
the question of tribal control over lands in which the
Navajos and Hopis may have a joint and undivided in-
terest. The two tribes feel that this question cannot be
adequately resolved until the nature of their rights is
ajudicated, and that the question is properly one for
determination by Congress rather than by the courts.
We agree with that position. Until the nature of the re-
spective interests is adjudicated it is difficult to deter-
mine whether any part of or interes in the lands
should be put under the exclusive jurisdiction of either
tribe.30
Thus, while the Healing court found an exclusive Hopi interest
in about 631,000 acres of land and awarded that land to the Hopi
Tribe, it simply made a finding that both tribes had an equal
and joint interest in another 1,822,000 acres. It made no disposition
of that land as "the question of a partition or other disposition
thereof 'is properly one for determination by Congress rather than
by the courts.' "31
There is no doubt that the court was fully aware that if the
jurisdictional act had given it the power to partition, it could have
partitioned the jointly-owned area in a manner other than by the
equal division of the surface. In a footnote, the court pointed to
the testimony of a representative of the Office of the Solicitor of
the Interior Department, Lewis Sigler, before a Congressional com-
mittee considering the jurisdictional act. That witness had noted
that after having found a joint-interest to exist, a court might
30. Healing v. Jones, 210 F. Supp. 125, 190 (D. Ariz. 1962) af]"d, 373 U.S. 758 (1963).
31. Id. at 191 (emphasis added).
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award "the surface to one group and the subsurface to another
group." 82 At a later point the court noted another observation by
the same witness to the effect that
in the event there is this split ownership adjudicated . . . the
feeling was Congress ought to take a look at the nature of
that split ownership before it decided which tribe would get
the control. 83
Healing v. Jones thus contained no express mandate to
the Congress as to the one and only proper way of appor-
tioning the interests in the joint-interest area, as Congressman
Owens suggested to his colleagues.3 4 What the Healing deci-
sion did provide was a definition of the property rights of the
Navajo and Hopi Tribes in the joint-interest area, rights which
the Congress must respect in keeping with the requirements imposed
by the Constitution of the United States. The question which must
now be considered is how wide is the latitude of the Congress
in dealing with these tribal property rights.
That the powers of the Congress in dealing with Indian land
are exceedingly broad has long been a basic precept in the field
of Federal Indian law:
The control by Congress of tribal lands has been one of the
most fundamental expressions, if not the major expression,
of the constitutional power of Congress over Indian affairs,
and has provided most frequent occasion for judicial analysis
of that power. From the wealth of judicial statement there
may be derived the basic principle that Congress has a very
wide power to manage and dispose of tribal lands.
The power of Congress extends from the control of use of the
lands, through the grant of adverse interests in the lands,
to the outright sale and removal of the Indians' interests.
And this is true, whether or not the lands are disposed of
for public or private purposes.8 5
In Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock3 6 the Supreme Court had explicitly
affirmed the principle that Congress has extremely broad powers
over Indian lands. There the plaintiff challenged the legal authority
of Congress to dispose of Indian lands in a manner contrary to
certain treaty provisions. The Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff's
contention with the following analysis:
32. Id. n.93 at 191 (Statement of Lewis Sigler).
83. Id. at 191 n.94.
34. See text accompanying nn. 1 & 2, supra.
35. F. CoHEN, FDEmAL HANDBOOK OF INDIAN LAW 94-95 (1942).
S6. 187 U.S. 558 (1903).
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To uphold the claim would be to adjudge that the indirect
operation of the treaty was to materially limit and qualify
the controlling authority of Congress in respect to the care
and protection of the Indians, and to deprive Congress, in a
possible emergency, when the necessity might be urgent for
a partition and disposal of the tribal lands, of all power to
act, if the assent of the Indians could not be obtained.
Plenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians
has been exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the
power has always been deemed a political one, not subject
to be controlled by the judicial department of the govern-
ment. 87
Only the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution
imposes a limitation on this plenary power. Courts have emphasized
that
[T]he allotment by the government or its agents of prop-
erty rightfully belonging to an Indian tribe to some other
party is a taking of that property for which the Indians are
entitled to receive just compensation [under the Fifth
Amendment], which includes the payment of interest.88
Thus, the authority of Congress over Indian lands
does not enable the United States without paying just com-
pensation therefore to appropriate lands of an Indian tribe
to its own use or to hand them over to others. 9
It necessarily follows that Congress is not restricted to the ter-
ritorial approach in disposing of lands in the joint-interest area.
Nothing in the Healing decision so limits Congress, and moreover,
such a restriction would contravene the legal principle that Congress
has broad discretion in dealing with Indian lands. Thus, Congress
possesses the power to dispose of the land in the joint-interest area
in any manner it considers appropriate as long as the requirements
of the Fifth Amendment are observed.
If Congress, a board of arbitrators authorized by Congress,40
or a court similarly authorized by Congress,4 1 were to make a
disposition of rights derived from the judgment in the Healing case,
what would be the options from which a choice could be made?
It would appear that in developing any plan for disposition one
can distinguish between a definitive allocation of rights in the land,
37. Id. at 564-65.
38. Miani Tribe of Oklahoma v. United States, 281 F.2d 202, 212 (Ct. C1. 1960), cert.
denied, 366 U.S. 924 (1961).
39. United States v. Kiamath and Moadoc Tribes, 304 U.S. 119, 123 (1938).
40. See, e.g., H.R. 7679, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
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on one hand, and a possibly more flexible allocation of use rights
or rights to income on the other. The possibilities available for
allocating rights in the land would fall into the following broad
categories:
(1) continued undivided ownership of all or part of the joint-interest
area;
(2) equal partitioning in kind of all or part of the joint-interest area;
(3) disproportionate allocation of rights in the joint-interest area
and the payment of cash for the difference between the value to
which the party would have been entitled and the value allocated
to it in kind.
These classes of possibilities, in turn, lead to a host of specific
options. One of these, based on the first and second possibilities
listed above, is that supported by the Hopis. It provides, as indicated
above, for a portion of the property rights in the joint-interest area,
the subsurface rights, to continue to be held in joint, undivided
and equal ownership, and for another portion, the surface rights,
to be divided equally in kind.42
The Navajos, by contrast, have given their support to an option
based on the first and third possibilities. They would dispose of
the subsurface interests in the same manner as the Hopis. But
as to the surface they favor an allocation of property rights based
on the pattern of actual use of the land on th e date of enactment
of Public Law 85-547, July 22, 1958. As the Hopis would receive
substantially less than a one-half interest, the Navajo-supported pro-
posal provides for a payment to them in cash for the value of
the rights relinquished by them.43
A third option would be the one mentioned by Lewis Sigler
in his 1957 testimony on the jurisdictional legislation: to grant the
surface to one tribe (presumably the Navajos, who are in possession
of the land) and the subsurface to the other (the Hopis). As the
value of the subsurface is likely to be substantially greater than
the surface, the grantee of the surface would have to receive a
cash payment for the deficiency in the value of the property allo-
cated to him. Alternatively, the grantee of the surface could receive
a percentage interest in the subsurface which would be large enough
to equalize the values allocated to the two parties.
The examples just given illustrate the variations which can be
41. See, e.g., H.R. 10337, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (Senate Committee Print dated
August 22, 1974).
42. See, e.g., S. 2424, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) H.R. 5647, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973) ; H.R. 10337, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
43. See, e.g., S. 3230, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) H.R. 7716, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973).
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considered in disposing of rights in the land. But beyond that there
are, as already indicated, a number of options available for the
allocation of rights to use land temporarily. One such option would
provide for the equal partitioning of the land between the two Tribes
but would grant a lifetime right to stay on their land to all adult
Navajos born in the 1882 Executive Order Reservation." Another
available option would be to hold some or all the land in joint
and undivided ownership, invest in programs to improve the quality
of the land, and then allow the Hopis to increase their grazing
use of the land over a period of time. During the time during
which the Hopis would make less than fifty per cent use of the
land, the Navajos would be required to make a payment in the nature
of rent to the Hopis. To guarantee their collection of such payments,
they could receive an assignment of the Navajo share of the mineral
income from the joint-interest area.
What this brief discussion has shown is that the decision-maker
in this matter has truly an arsenal of options available in making
a disposition of the Navajo and Hopi tribal interests in keeping
with the decision in Healing v. Jones and the Constitution of the
United States. The question to be considered now is what factors
should be weighed in choosing one option over another.
The position taken by the Navajo Tribe is that whatever option
is chosen, it should be one which does not force families which
now live and for a long time have lived in the joint-interest area
to leave their homes, give up their way of life, and move into
a setting which is alien to them and in which the heads of families,
who are now engaged in sheepherding, become totally unemployed
and probably unemployable. H.R. 10337, as passed by the House
of Representatives on May 29, 1974, would do precisely that. To
cushion the blow, it would authorize the expenditure of $28,800,000
of Federal money 5 on behalf of the people who are to be removed
from their homes. What Navajos have asked for is that the Federal
Government avoid a course which would cause human suffering
and would cause the expenditure of substantial sums of public funds
on the removal of people from a condition in which they are self-
supporting to one in which they are likely to become chronic welfare
dependents.
Against this argument in support of the Navajos, based on the
present and on the immediate future, supporters of the Hopi cause
have emphasized the past. They contend that the solution which
44. See, e.g., S. 3724, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
45. This amount, authorized by Sec. 24(a) of H.R. 10337, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. as it
passed the House of Representatives, would also be available for Navajos who would be
expelled from another tract, the so-called Moencopi area. Navajos estimated that 14% of
the potential expellees would come from the Moencopi area.
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they seek, aggrandizement of the Hopi Reservation, would constitute
an act of historic justice. It is, therefore, appropriate to examine
those aspects of the history of the area and its peoples which appear
to have relevance to the present-day controversy.
III. CONSIDERATION OF "HISTORIC JUSTICE"
The proposition that enlargement of the Hopi Reservation would
be an act of historic justice is based on the assertions that (a)
the area now in dispute has traditionally been "Hopi country" and
(b) that it was the intent of the Executive Order of December
16, 1882, to set the entire reservation area aside for the Hopi Tribe.
As will now be shown, neither of these assertions is supported
by the facts.
An examination of the historic and anthropological evidence
makes it clear that the joint-interest area was "Hopi country" only
in the same sense that the Dakotas and parts of Nebraska, Montana,
and Wyoming were once Sioux country, Tennessee was Cherokee
country, and parts of New York and Pennsylvania were Iroquois
country. To say that the joint-interest area was Hopi country means
only that at some point in the past members of the Hopi Tribe
made occasional and sporadic use of the land which surrounds the
present Hopi Reservation.
This occasional and sporadic use may have been sufficient, as
of the time of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848, to establish
an Indian title interest, the extinguishment of which entitles the
Hopis to compensation under the Indian Claims Commission Act.4
But that Act, in providing for only monetary compensation rather
than a returning of the land in kind, underlines the fact that the
United States Government recognizes changes in circumstances,
changes in land use, and does not, in dealing with rights in Indian
land, attempt to restore settled areas to a status quo ante of 'a
bygone century.
What the available evidence indicates is that Hopi Indians have
for hundreds of years lived in villages on mesa tops within the
boundaries of the present Hopi Reservation .4 They would farm
in the near vicinity of the villages and would generally spend the
night within the village. They would thus make intensive economic
use only of a circular area surrounding the mesas, the radius of
which would not exceed half a day's travel from the village. 48
On occasions, Hopis would travel to more distant places, "for the
purpose of cutting and gathering wood, obtaining coal, gathering
46. Act of August 13. 1946, ch. 959, 60 Stat. 1049; 25 U.S.C. § 70 et 8eq. (1970).
47. Healing v. Jones, 210 F. Supp. at 184.
48. Se H. JAMES, THm Hopi INDIANS 111-12 (1956).
ANOTHER TRAIL OF TEARS?
plants and plant products, visiting ceremonial shrines, and hunt-
ing."' 9 But such sporadic uses left a large region basically unoc-
cupied and unused.
It is that region, surrounding the area of intensive Hopi use,
which the Navajos entered and of which they began to make use
in a manner which was not in conflict with sporadic Hopi use.50
As the Healing court noted, the Navajos "entered what is now
Arizona in the last half of the eighteenth century." 51
After the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848, when Arizona
and New Mexico came under United States sovereignty, Anglo set-
tlement of the Rio Grande valley resulted in the Navajos being
pushed westward.5 2 Their numbers in northeastern Arizona increas-
ed rapidly after 1850 and they began to populate the area around
the Hopi mesas. 53 The Healing court found with specific reference
to the land here in dispute:
The evidence is overwhelming that Navajo Indians used
and occupied parts of the 1882 reservation, in Indian fashion,
as their continuing and permanent area of residence, from
long prior to the creation of the reservation in 1882 to July
22, 1958, when any rights which any Indians had acquired in
the reservation became vested.54
Granted that Navajos lived on the land now in dispute prior
to 1882, when it was part of the public domain, did its withdrawal
in 1882 to create an Executive Order Reservation grant exclusive
legal or moral rights in the area to the Hopis? A mere examination
of the text of the Executive Order must result in a negative answer
to that question for, as already noted, the land was set aside for
"the Moqui [Hopi], and such other Indians as the Secretary
of the Interior may see fit to settle thereon."55
It has been argued in support of the Hopi cause that the "other
Indians" clause was standard language, used in many other Execu-
tive Orders of that period. The answer is that it was indeed standard
language where the Government wanted to keep its options open.
Where the Government wanted to reserve land for one tribe alone
it did so by not inserting the "other Indians" clause. 5
49. Healing v. Jones, 210 F. Supp. at 174.
50. See ABERLE, ANOTHER INDIAN RELOCATION? WHEN WILL THEY EVER LEARN? 1, 20-21
(June 24, 1974) (Unpublished statement on file with the Senate Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs).
51. Id. at 134. Some anthropologists believe that they were there as early as 1540. See
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the Houwe Comm. on Interior and In-
sular Affairs, 9srd Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (1973) (Statement of Professor David F. Aberle).
52. See generally F. McNiTr, NAVAJO WARS 95-156 (1972).
53. ld. at 385-410.
54. 210 F. Supp. at 144-45.
55. Id. at 129 n.1 (emphasis added).
56. See, e.g., Executive Order of January 4, 1883 (establishing a reservation for the
Hualapai Indians). Quoted in C. KAPPILm, LAws AND TREATIES 804 (1904) ; Executive Order
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The conclusion that it was not the intent of the Executive Order
to grant exclusive rights to the Hopi Indians is also borne out
by an examination of the official correspondence preceding the pro-
mulgation of the Order. From 1876 on, the Office of Indian Affairs
had given serious consideration to the creation of an Indian reserva-
tion in northeastern Arizona. Among the suggestions submitted by
field officials was the idea of creating a relatively small reservation
for the Hopis (the 1876 recommendation was for 32,000 acres) or
a very large reservation for both Hopis and Navajos. 7 No action
was taken on any of these recommendations for a number of years.5 8
It was on December 16, 1882, that a reservation was finally
created by Executive Order. 9 None of the thoughtful reports on
the conditions of the Indians in the area played a significant role
in that decision. Instead, the Executive Order appears to have been
prompted by the eagerness of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs
to cause the eviction of a former employee, a Dr. Sullivan, from
a Hopi village. It was only when the Commissioner discovered that
he could not lawfully cause Sullivan's eviction as long as the 'land
of the Hopis was not withdrawn from the public domain that the
decision to create a reservation was made.60 The Commissioner
then ordered his local agent to send him a description of the area
to be withdrawn.61 The agent cheerfully obliged by recommending
the withdrawal of about 2,453,000 acres. His recommendation was
sent forward on December 4, 1882, and was received in Washington
on December 12.62 The following day, December 13, 1882, the Com-
missioner forwarded a draft Executive Order to the Secretary of
the Interiores and on December 16, 1882, the Executive Order was
signed. No one in Washington had ever had a chance to review
critically the recommendations of the local agent. If this had been
done, it would have become apparent that the area which had
now been withdrawn from the public domain was an area which
included not only the Hopi area of occupancy but an area of Navajo
occupancy as well.
What would seem a rather cavalier way of disposing of the
public domain appears in a different light when the "other Indians"
clause is remembered. By inserting that clause, the Secretary of
the Interior kept all his options open. The Government was not
giving anything away. On the contrary, all the President did by
of March 31, 1882 (establishing a reservation for' the Yaval Suppal Indians), quoted in C.
KAPPLER, LAWS AND TREATIES 809 (1904).
57. 210 F. Supp. at 135.
58. Id. at 136.
59. Id. at 137.
60. Id. at 136-37.
61. Id. at 136 (Telegram from H. Price to J. I-. Fleming, November 27, 1882).
62. See Letter from J. H. Fleming to H. Price, December 4, 1882, portions reprinted in
210 F. Supp. 187.
63. Letter from H. Price to 1lhe Scretry of the Interior, December 13, 1882, at 3-4.
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issuing the Executive Order was vest the power in officials of the
Executive Branch to exclude from the land here in issue persons
who were deemed undesirable.
That the 1882 Executive Order did not vest any legal rights
in the Hopis was judicially confirmed in Healing v. Jones:
The right of use and occupance gained by the Hopi Indian
Tribe on December 16, 1882, was not then a vested right. As
stated in our earlier opinion, an unconfirmed executive order
creating an Indian reservation conveys no right of use or oc-
cupancy to the beneficiaries beyond the pleasure of Congress
or the President. Such use and occupancy may be terminated
by the unilateral action of the United States -without legal
liability for compensation. The Hopis were therefore no more
than tenants at the will of the Government at that time.64
But, the Hopis argue further, one of the major purposes of
the 1882 Executive Order was to keep intruders out of Hopi 'land.
These intruders included non-Indians as well as Indians. Among
the latter, in particular, were Navajos.
There is no doubt that, perhaps because of their different life
styles, Navajo sheepherders and Hopi farmers had often found them-
selves in disputes, disputes which may very well go back to the
time when Navajos first entered this area in northeastern Arizona.
What an examination of the recorded history of these disputes re-
veals, however, is that they would invariably involve Navajo live-
stock crossing Hopi fields or Navajos and Hopis arguing over water-
ing holes in the vicinity of the mesas. In other words, the problem
arose where Navajos would enter the area of intensive Hopi use
and occupancy. 5 That was the area from which the Government
undoubtedly wanted to see all intruders, including Navajos, removed.
Hopi economic use and occupancy did not in 1882 extend to
the entire Executive Order Reservation.6 6 To be sure, the Healing
court suggested that it may have been the intent of the Government
to provide for both present and future economic needs of the Hopis.6 7
However, it cites no evidence to support that conclusion. The fact
is that the evidence before the Commissioner of Indian Affairs,
the Secretary of the Interior, and the President at the time the
Executive Order was issued suggested that only the area of actual
Hopi use and occupance was being protected. On December 4, 1882,
when he sent his proposed boundaries to the Commissioner of Indian
64. 210 F. Supp. at 138.
65. The incidents which led to the establishment of the Parker-Keam line of 1891 are
examples of the conflicts that arose when Navajos impinged upon the Hopi area of use and
occupancy. See text accompanying note 71 infra.
66. 210 F. Supp. at 138.
67. Id.
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Affairs, the Indian agent to the Hopis, J. H. Fleming, had written:
Your telegram of Nov. 27, 1882, directing me to "Now de-
scribe the boundaries for reservation that will include Moqui
villages and agency, and large enough to meet all needful pur-
poses and no larger", and to "forward by mail immediately"
is at hand, and I cheerfully submit the same, prefacing the
following remarks.
The lands most desirable for the Moquis, and which were
cultivated by them 8 or 10 years ago, have been taken up
by the Mormons and others, so that such as is embraced in
the prescribed boundaries, is only that which they have been
cultivating within the past few years. The lands embraced
within these boundaries are desert lands, much of it worth-
less even for grazing purposes. That which is fit for cultiva-
tion even by the Indian method, is found in small patches
here and there at or near springs, and in the valeys [sic]
which are overflowed by the rains, and hold moisture during
the summer sufficient, to perfect the growth of their peculiar
corn.
The same land cannot be cultivated a number of years in
succession, so that they change about, allowing the land cul-
tivated one year, to rest several years. I think that the pre-
scribed boundaries, embraces sufficient land for their agri-
cultural and grazing purposes, but certainly not more.68
The population of the Hopi Tribe at this time totaled 1,813 per-
sons.69 It is seriously to be doubted that Agent Fleming's superiors
in Washington believed that an allocation of about 1,350 acres for
every Hopi man, woman and child complied with the instruction
that the area to be set aside be "large enough to meet all needful
purposes and no larger." They solved the problem by not limiting
the Reservation to the Hopis but by obtaining authority to place
on it "such other Indians as the Secretary of the Interior may
see fit to settle thereon."
It is reasonable to presume that neither the Hopis nor the Na-
vajos had any idea that the Executive Order had been issued or
had any understanding of the lines which Agent Fleming had drawn
on a map. 0 But, as the years passed, the Executive Order took
on a life of its own. The letters which had been exchanged between
Office of Indian Affairs field officials and the central office in 1882
were probably filed away and the only point of reference was the
Executive Order itself.
It was in the period from 1888 to 1891 that the United States
68. Letter from J. H. Fleming to H. Price, December 4, 1882, at 1-2 (emphasis added);
Healing v. Jones, 210 F. Supp. at 137 n.7.
69. 210 F. Supp. at 137.
70. Letter from A. McD. McCook to H. K. Bailey, January 3, 1891.
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Government was called upon to deal forcefully with the question
,f where to draw the line between the area of Hopi occupancy
and the area of Navajo occupancy. A complaint had reached the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs that Navajos were destroying Hopi
crops and ruining their grazing land. The Government intervened
and early in January 1891 the problem was finally resolved by
drawing "a circular boundary around the Hopi villages, having a
radius of 16 miles, within which the Navajos were instructed not
to enter."7 1 That area evidently encompassed what was considered
the Hopi area of economic use and occupancy.
That no one in the field, Indian or non-Indian, had any idea
of where the 1882 line was is evident from the official correspon-
dence of that period. On December 31, 1890, Captain H. K. Bailey,
Acting Assistant Adjutant General for the Department of Arizona,
wrote:
It is known that the Navajoes and Moquis have intermar-
ried and that there is continuous trading between them, and
with this understanding you will be very guarded in your
action, especially with the Navajoes, and under no circum-
stances, if it can be avoided, will any harsh measures be
taken towards them at this time. The lines separating the
Navajo and Moqui reservations are not marked with a degree
of plainness that an ordinary Indian can understand. There
was no person at or near Keams' Canyon known to the Depart-
ment Commander who could even indicate points on boundary
lines, and until this line is distinctly marked only persuasive
[sic] measures will be used towards the Navajoes in thie
regard.72
A few days later, on January 3, 1891, Brigadier General A.
McD. McCook, Commander of the Department of Arizona, expressed
a similar view:
It is recommended that the line of demarkation between
the Navajo and Moqui reservation be distinctly marked by
indestructable monuments upon the natural elevations along
the lines, and that the water in the neighborhood of the line
and lying east thereof be reserved for the Navajos, and that
to the west for the Moquis. Until this is done I do not deem
it wise to use force to prevent the Navajoes from grazing
near the Moqui reservation.
The Navajos or Moquis do not know where the line be-
tween their reservation is, nor do I; hence any coercive action
on our part would not be wise until the line is definitely
settled.7 8
71. 210 F. Supp. at 148.
72. Letter from R. K. Bailey to Charles H. Grlerson, December 31, 1890.
73. Letter from A. McD. McCook to n. K. Bailey, January 3, 1891.
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Various government officials then met at Keams Canyon to dis-
cuss the Navajo-Hopi problem among themselves and with repre-
sentatives of the two Tribes. Among the persons present were Special
Agent George W. Parker of the Office of Indian Affairs and T. V.
Keam, a local pioneer. Agreement was reached on a line, thereafter
known as the Parker-Keam line, which would define the area re-.
served for Hopi use and which Navajos would not be allowed to
cross with their herds. That line, a circular boundary sixteen miles
from the Hopi villages, was then marked by mounds and monu-
ments with the cooperation of both Hopis and Navajos. 74
The Healing court did not find this agreement reached in the
field in 1891 to be legally significant.7 5 But it is historically signifi-
cant in indicating what the parties as well as other local observers
considered a fair and just arrangement in the absence of any clear
understanding of the meaning of the 1882 Executive Order. It is
the Parker-Keam area, subsequently somewhat enlarged, which is
the Hopi Reservation of today.7 6
In the years that followed the establishment of the Parker-Keam
line, differing official views were held, from time to time, as to
what the language of the 1882 Executive Order really meant. Some
officials were of the view that the entire Executive Order Reserva-
tion was the land of the Hopis and that the Navajos had no rights
in it, that they were trespassers. Other officials thought that the
Navajos were the "other Indians" who had been "settled" on the
land by the Secretary of the Interior. The objective fact was that
the Hopis stayed in the area which they had occupied immediately
before 1882 and immediately thereafter and that the Navajos, in
turn, continued to occupy after 1882 the area which they had occu-
pied in the decades preceding 1882. 77
Following 1891, the United States Government clearly acquiesced
in Navajo presence on the Reservation, although no one seemed
to have considered it necessary or appropriate to take the action
which a court would have considered a formal act of "settling."
This failure to act, which evidently puzzled the Healing court, is
understandable in light of the policies of detribalization which were
dominant in Federal Indian policy as viewed from Washington, be-
tween the enactment of the General Allotment Act of 1887 and
the advent of the Hoover Administration in 1929.78 In that period
increasingly less attention was paid to tribal rights as such, as
74. 210 F. Supp. at 148.
75. The District Court based this conclusion on the fact that the Parker-Keam line did
not receive the formal approval of the Secretary of the Interior. Id. at 148-49.
76. The area within the Parker-Keam line would have been about 514,720 acres. The
Hopi Reservation today consists of 631,194 acres.
77. 210 F. Supp. at 168-69.
78. See S. TYLER, A HISTORY OF INDIAN POLICY 91 (1973).
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the Government' followed a policy in which the powers of local
agents of the Office of Indian Affairs were considered paramount
and their primary effort was to turn individual Indians, regardless
of tribal background, into agriculturists. 79 (This explains the at-
tempts, in 1911, to grant allotments of land in the Executive Order
Reservation to about three hundred Navajos.) 80
The Parker-Keam line, it turned out, had not resolved the contest
between Navajos and Hopis forever. In 1918, an Office of Indian
Affairs official complained that the area of Hopi occupancy had
been reduced to about 600 square miles (384,000 acres) as a result
of Navajo pressure.8 1 The Hopis, quite understandably, asked for
redress and as a result the Department of the Interior began, in
the Nineteen Twenties, to give serious consideration to the possibility
of formally dividing the Executive Order Reservation between the
Navajo and Hopi Tribes.8 2 But it was only in 1931 that the Commis-
sioner of Indian Affairs and the Secretary of the Interior officially
agreed that such a division should take place. 83
However, by the time the Department of the Interior's decision
to divide the Executive Order Reservation had been made, the
Executive branch of the government no longer had the authority
to alter the boundaries of Executive Order reservations. The Act
of March 3, 1927, vested the sole power to take such action in
the Congress.84 For a brief period of time Congressional action
appeared to be a possibility,8 5 but after 1933 all such attempts
were abandoned. Thus, by the early nineteen thirties the Executive
branch of the government was no longer legally capable of dividing
the Executive Order Reservation, and Congress appeared to be un-
willing to do so.
The concept of segregating land for the exclusive use of the
Hopi Tribe was revived when the Commissioner of Indian Affairs
began to enforce new land management regulations on Indian land.
The Office of Indian Affairs divided the Navajo and Executive Or-
der Reservations into "land management" districts, and set aside
one such area, District 6, for the exclusive use of the Hopi Tribe,
79. See A. JOSEPHY, JR., THE INDIAN HERITAGE OF AMERICA 350 (1st ed. 1968).
80. 210 F. Supp. at 149-50.
81. Letter from L. Crane to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, March 12, 1918 at 4.
82. 210 F. Supp. at 154-57.
83. See Letter from C. J. Rhoads to H. J. Hagerman, February 7, 1931, portions re-
printed in Healing v. Jones, 210 F. Supp. at 156.
84. The Act of March 3, 1927, provided that
[c~hanges in the boundaries of reservations created by Executive order,
proclamation, or otherwise for the use and occupancy of Indians shall not
be made except by Act of Congress: Provided, That this shall not apply to
temporary withdrawals by the Secretary of the Interior.
Act of March 3, 1927, ch. 299, § 4, 44 Stat. 1347; 25 U.S.C. § 398(d) (1963).
85. See, e.g., S. 5696, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. (1933).
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reserving the remainder of the land for the exclusive use, of the
Navajos. 6
The original District 6 included 499,248 acres, 87 but soon after
this allocation was made, the Department of the Interior initiated
an
effort to make final adjustments in the boundaries of district
6 so that the district would contain all lands used or needed
by the Hopis, and then to set aside that area as an exclusive
Hopi reservation, leaving the remainder of the 1882 reserva-
tion for the exclusive use of the Navajos. s8
An official investigation conducted in 1939 and 1940 resulted
in a recommendation that District 6 be enlarged by adding 21,479
acres. 9 After a further review of the matter, the Department of
the Interior recommended in 1941 that 29,575 acres be added. 90
However, the Hopi Tribal Council rejected these suggested ad-
ditions,91 and in an attempt to satisfy the Hopi Tribe, yet a third
study was undertaken, which resulted in a proposal that 142,549
acres be added to District 6.92 In 1942 the Hopi Tribal Council
officially approved this recommendation, which would have increas-
ed District 6 to 641,797 acres. 93 However, before the recommenda-
tion could be implemented, the Department of the Interior reduced
the addition slightly, by 10,603 acres.9' Thus, the area within Dis-
trict 6, which in 1958 the Healing court determined to be the Hopi
Indian Reservation, was fixed at 631,194 acres.95
As a result of the establishment of District 6, all lands which
the Hopi Tribe had used and occupied for decades prior and at
any time since 1882 were restored to its exclusive control. Beyond
that, in District 6 the Hopi Tribe received more than 98% of the
area which the Hopi Tribal Council had approved as the area to
be included in District 6.96
The conclusion is inescapable that whatever historic injustices
the Hopi Tribe may have suffered at an earlier time were remedied
in 1943 when 631,194 acres were segregated for the exclusive use
and occupancy of the Hopi Tribe. In fact, the 1943 decision may
very well have allocated more land to the Hopis than was justified,
for, as the Healing court noted,
86. 210 F. Supp. at 159.
87. Id. at 161.
88. Id. at 159-60.
89. Id. at 161.
90. Id. at 162.
91. Id. at 164.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 166.
94. Id. at 165.
95. Id. at 166.
96. Id.
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[r]any Navajo families, probably more than one hundred,
then living within the extended part: of district 6, were requir-
ed to move outside the new boundaries and severe personal
hardships were undoubtedly experienced by some. 97
IV. CONGRESSIONAL AND JUDICIAL ERROR
Why did the 1943 settlement, which deviated from the proposal
which the Hopi Tribal Council had considered acceptable by only
10,603 acres, fail to resolve the longstanding question as to the
rights of Hopis and Navajos within the 1882 Executive Order Reser-
vation? Legally speaking, the answer is two-fold. First of all, the
Interior Department Solicitor's Office had cast doubt on the validity
of an administrative division of the Reservation which denied the
Hopis access to grazing areas within the Executive Order Reserva-
tion but outside of District 6. The Solicitor's Office suggested that
by limiting the Hopis, the Executive Branch was doing by indirection
what it could no longer do directly, that is alter the 1882 Executive
Order Reservation." The l ower to make such alteration was now
entirely with the Congress. Second, there was doubt as to the precise
nature of the legal rights which the Tribes had to the land in
question here pursuant to the 1882 Executive Order. With the possi-
bility of mineral exploitation of the Reservation area before them,
all parties concerned were interested in seeing a clearer definition
made of the tribal rights in the land. Also, as there was a question
as to whether either Tribe had a vested right in the land, the
Tribes were interested in legislation which would make certain that
the Indian rights in the Executive Order lands were vested and
thus compensable. It is against this background that both Tribes
supported the legislation which became the Act of July 22, 1958,
Public Law 85-547.
There is serious doubt that Congress acted wisely in 1958 when
it enacted Public Law 85-547. What Congress did, in effect, was
to convey the beneficial interest in 2,453,000 acres of publicly-owned
land to Indian grantees, some of which were named and others
of which were not named, and then left the question to the courts
to calculate who, given the statutory words used by the Congress,
was entitled to what. It has been established that Congress did,
prior to July 22, 1958, have complete freedom in disposing of the
Executive Order Reservation without creating any rights to com-
pensation.99 If it had tackled that job, would it have divided the
land as the Healing court did by giving 30% of the population
an interest in 63% of the land, and 70% of the population 37%
97. Id.
98. Id. at 179-80.
99. Id. at 138.
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of the land?100 Would Congress have made such an allocation if
it had known that such a distribution could be a basis for rendering
thousands of people homeless and might require the appropriation
of substantial funds to relocate them? The likely answer to both
questions is "no." It follows that rather than requiring the courts
to wrestle with a multitude of legalisms and then having to face
the possibly unintended consequences of the court decision, Congress
could in 1958 have allocated the rights to the Executive Order Res-
ervation in such manner as would best serve the public interest.
But the Congress chose another course, and it was ultimately
on highly technical grounds, rather than on grounds of public policy
that the court in the Healing case decided the issue of the ownership
of what thereafter became the joint-interest area. To begin with,
the court held that the very language of the 1882 Executive Order
gave the Hopis
[t]he right of use and occupancy . . . [of] the entire area
embraced within the December 16, 1882, reservation, and was
not limited to the part of that reservation then used and oc-
cupied by them. 01
Further, the court held, as heretofore noted, that in 1931 the Navajos
were "settled," within the meaning of the 1882 Executive Order,
on that portion of the reservation which was not included in District
6.
What the court further held, and this part of the holding was
crucial to its ultimate decision, was that the Hopis had never aban-
doned their interest in the area outside of District 6, which had
been derived from the 1882 Executive Order, and that the Secretary
of the Interior did not, after the Act of March 3, 1927, have the
power to cut off Hopi rights in that area without the consent of
the Congress. The rights of the Hopis, therefore, co-existed with
the rights of the Navajos in the 1,822,000 acres of the Executive
Order Reservation which lay outside District 6. The court thus con-
cluded that the rights of the two Tribes in that land were joint
and undivided.112
The reasoning of the Healing court which led to the conclusion
that the interests of the two Tribes in the area are joint and undi-
vided is entirely plausible. But the court reached one additional
100. In 1958 approximately 8,800 Navajos resided in the Executive Order Reservation.
Healing v. Jones, 210 F. Supp. at 168. The Hopi population probably was no more than
3,700 in 1958. The Healing court observed that in 1951 approximately 3,200 Iopis resided
In the Executive Order Reservation, and if an annual rate of increase of 2.5% is assumed,
the Hopi population would have increased by slightly more than 500 during the period from
1951 to 1958.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 189.
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conclusion, which it never explained and which is supported by
neither the evidence nor established case law. It held that the rights
of the two Tribes in the 1,822,000 acres were equal as well as
joint and undivided. 103
If the court had jurisdiction to reach the conclusion that the
two Tribes had equal rights in the area of the Executive Order
Reservation outside District 6, that is an adjudicated holding. The
Hopi Tribe cannot be deprived of the vested property right which
stems from that holding. But in analyzing the issue of whether the
Hopis should now be granted 911,000 acres in the name of historic
justice, or should otherwise be made whole, it is highly appropriate
to analyze whether the Healing court was right when it reached
the conclusion that the Hopis had in 1958 acquired a one-half undi-
vided interest in the 1,822,000 acres of land which were used and
occupied by Navajos. For if the conclusion is reached that the
Healing court erred in awarding a half interest to the Hopi Tribe,
the least that can be done now is to dispose of that interest in such
manner as the injured party, the Navajo Tribe, suggests.
In examining the rights of Hopis and Navajos outside of District
6, the Healing court noted:
It is true that, as a practical matter, the entirely valid set-
tlement of Navajos in the part of the 1882 Reservation outside
of District 6, even without the legal restraint which the gov-
ernment placed upon the Hopis, would have greatly limited
the amount of surface use the Hopis could have made of the
outer reaches of the reservation. Though Hopi and Navajo
rights of use and occupancy were equal, members of both
tribes could not physically utilize the same tract at the same
time. This was a hazard to which the Hopis were at all times
subject because of the authority reserved in the Secretary to
settle other Indians on the reservation.
10 4
The court then went on to stress that if there had been no
Governmental restraint nor Navajo pressure, the Hopis would have
used more 'land:
But without such Governmental restraint and without Navajo
pressure in becoming joint occupants there would unquestion-
ably have been a substantial movement of Hopis into the area
outside of District 6, which they presumably would have still
been using and occupying on July 22, 1958.105
What the court was thus saying, in effect, is that it understood
that individual Navajo families and individual Hopi families could
103. Id.
104. Id. at 188.
105. Id.
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not co-exist on precisely the same tract, that the area would have
had to be divided between the Navajos and Hopis and that the
apportionment of land as between Hopis and Navajos, granted that
both of them were in the area lawfully, would have been different
if the Hopis had not been restricted to District 6.
It has been shown above that the 1943 division of the Executive
Order Reservation between Hopis and Navajos was eminently fair
to the Hopis and came very close to what the Hopi Tribal Council
had accepted as a reasonable solution to the problem. Nevertheless,
the court had concluded that the grazing regulations and Navajo
pressure had restricted the Hopis' economic use of lands outside
District 6. Given the fact that Navajos and Hopis in the Executive
Order Reservation both had rights outside District 6, how would
the lands have been reasonably apportioned? Would it have been
done by setting one-half aside for the Hopis and the other half
for the Navajos or would it have been more likely that the land
would have been apportioned so as to provide for Reservation-wide
equality among all members of both Tribes? Certainly, on reserva-
tions on which allotments were made to the members of different
tribes, the custom was for equal allotments to be given to individual
Indians, not for the reservation to be divided equally between the
interested tribes as corporate entities, and the size of the individual
allotment depending on the number of members in each tribe, the
members of the smaller tribes receiving more land than the mem-
bers of the larger tribes. 06
Significantly, the Indian Claims Commission and the United
States Court of Claims, which have had a unique and influential
role in shaping the legal rules for settling Indian title questions,
consistently have refused to apply to Indian tribal lands the common
law principle that joint interests are necessarily equal. In Kiowa,
Comanche, and Apache Tribes v. United States" the Commission
analyzed the manner in which the quantum of an Indian tribe's
joint interest in land will be determined:
In the case of Sioux Nation v. United States... the Commis-
sion .. .discussed the manner of determining the interest
of separate bands or tribes who have been granted recognized
title to one tract of land by the same treaty. In that case the
Commission found that the most reasonable method of divid-
ing tribal interests was by population averages near the ef-
fective date of the treaty of recognition. Alternatively, evi-
106. Among the many Indian reservations on which equal allotments were made to mem-
bers of different tribes are the Fort Peck and Fort Belknap Reservotions of Montana, the
Fort Hall Reservation of Idaho, and the Colville Reservation of Washington.
107. 26 Ind. Cl. Comm. 101 (1971).
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dence as to the use of the recognized title area by the respec-
tive tribes may be weighed.'10
Furthermore, the Indian Claims Commission has indicated that it
will award equal fractional interests only if adequate population
figures or sufficient evidence of historical patterns of use and oc-
cupancy is lacking.109
Both the Indian Claims Commission and the Court of Claims
have relied on patterns of use and occupancy as the basis for
quantifying the joint interests of Indian tribes. In Otoe & Missouria
Tribe of Indians v. United States"10 the Commission determined the
quantum of the joint interests of plaintiffs by deciding how much
of the land in question each of the three tribes historically had
used and occupied."' In Miami Tribe of Oklahoma v. United States 1"2
the Court of Claims acknowledged the validity of this principle
by observing that Indian tribes normally are required to prove
the extent of their interest in land by evidence of use and occu-
pancy." 3
Population figures also have been relied upon as a basis for
quantifying the joint interests of Indian tribes. This approach has
been used in several instances as a method for settling Indian
claims cases. The Commission adverted to one such case in Blackfeet
and Gros Ventre Tribes v. United States: "1
The Cheyenne-Arapahoe Tribes v. United States case .. was
decided .. . to be a common claim on the basis of the facts
of that case. The tribes had been a single entity at one time
and were divided by defendant afterward. Also the evidence
showed that the separate tribes each continued to occupy
one-half of the original area after being separated by defend-
ant. The final award was made on the basis of a stipulation
by the parties reflecting the population. of the tribes as of
1958.115
In the Blackfeet case the Commission applied in a decided case
the 'legal principle that the quantum of an Indian tribe's joint interest
should be determined on the basis of population figures. The inter-
venors in the Blackfeet case, the Sioux Tribe of the Fort Peck
Reservation and the Assiniboine Tribe, contended that the four tribes
involved in the case should be awarded equal fractional shares.
108. Id. at 120.
109. James Strong v. United States, 30 Ind. C1. Comm. 8 (1973) ; Pottawatomie Tribe of
Indians v. United States, 30 Ind. C1. Comm. 42 (1973).
110. 5 Ind. C1. Comm. 316 (1957).
111. Id. at 346-50.
112. 146 Ct. C1. 421 (1959).
118. Id. at 442-45.
114. 18 Ind. C1. Comm. 241 (1967).
115. Id. at 322 (emphasis added).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
The Commission rejected the intervenors' contention with the fol-
lowing analysis:
Intervenors contend that their interest consists of an undivid-
ed one-fourth share each. They base this contention on the
law of property which is perfectly valid in the case of indivi-
duals who take an interest under an instrument which does
not specify the particular share of each. In such a case the
interest is presumed to be in common and therefore equal.
To apply such a rule to Indian lands would lead to an
unjust result in most cases. Indian rights in land are tribal
in nature and not individual. If we tried to equate tribal
rights with individual rights and thereby create an equal in-
terest in an area among the tribes using and occupying it,
we would be ignoring the basic fact of Indian use and occu-
pancy. We would be creating a common law concept of title
in an area where such a concept had never grown by custom
or usage. The smallest tribe would be entitled to as much
as the largest one. To do this would be contrary to reason
since a subsistence use of land necessarily implies a use in
proportion to numbers. Where there is no evidence of inten-
tion to the contrary and no language stating what interest
shall be taken, we think the proper and just manner of divid-
iL.ng tribal interests in a given area is by population as of the
date of cession, or an average population near that date,
whichever is more reasonable under the particular circum-
stances.1 6
The Indian Claims Commission affirmed the validity of this
legal principle in Sioux Nation v. United States.117 The Commission
found that the plaintiffs, who were various bands of the Sioux Tribe
and who were all parties to the Treaty of Fort Laramie, held
a joint and undivided interest in certain lands. The Commission
indicated that it could choose from two alternative methods for
fixing the quantum of each plaintiff's undivided interest: (1) a ten-
ancy in common formula which would result in an award to the
Sioux bands of equal interests; or (2) a population formula on
the basis of which each band would receive an interest proportionate
to its population. The Commission rejected the first alternative and
held that "the most reasonable manner of dividing tribal interests
is by population averages near the effective date of the Treaty
of Fort Laramie." 118
Thus, to determine the quantum of the joint interest of Indian
tribes, the Indian Claims Commission and the Court of Claims have
departed from the common law maxim that in the absence of an
explicit provision to the contrary the interests of joint tenants are
116. Id. at 321 (emphasis added).
117. 24 Ind. C1. Comm. 147 (1970).
118. Id. at 158.
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equal. The Commission has indicated in a number of cases that
such interests should be quantifi d on the basis of population figures
or evidence relating to patterns of use and occupancy.
An application of the correct rule of law in the Healing case
would have resulted in a dramatic alteration of the holding that
the joint interests of the Navajo and Hopi Tribes were equal. As
the opinion itself explained,
[b]y the summer of 1958,119 the Navajo population in the
1882 reservation was probably about 8,800, not including a
few Navajos living within district 6, as expanded in 1943.120
On the other hand, "[b]y the summer of 1958, the Hopi population
was probably something in excess of [3,200]. Most of these Hopis
resided within District 6, as expanded in 1943.'' 21 Thus, if the Dis-
trict Court had computed the quantum of each Tribe's interest in the
entire Executive Order Reservation on the basis of comparative
population figures, no reasonable doubt can exist that the Navajo
Tribe would have been entitled to almost all 'lands in the joint-interest
area.
Nor would the result have been different if the District Court
had used patterns of use and occupancy as the basis for determining
the quantum of each Tribe's joint interest. According to the District
Court's own findings, "[t]he places of residence of the Navajos
within the 1882 reservation were scattered quite generally over the
entire area outside of district 6.' ' 2 By contrast only a few Hopis
"had homes, farms or grazing 'lands [outside district 6] in the
1882 reservation. ' 12 3 Hopi activities in the joint-interest area were
limited almost exclusively to "wood cutting and gathering, obtaining
coal, gathering plants and plant products for medicinal, ceremonial,
handicrafts and other purposes, visiting of ceremonial shrines, and
a limited amount of hunting. ' ' 124 In 1958 most of the surface area
in the joint-interest area was utilized by Navajos rather than Hopis.
Thus, if the District Court had computed the quantum of each Tribe's
joint interest on the basis of the amount of acreage each Tribe
used and occupied, there again can be no serious doubt that the
Navajo Tribe would have been awarded virtually all the land which
is now the joint-interest area.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL INVALIDITY OF EXPULSION SOLUTION
Earlier in this article we have shown that ever since Lone Wolf
119. The District Court selected this date as the measuring point because it was the year
In which the interests of the Navajo and Hopi Tribes in the Executive Order Reservation
vested.
120. 210 F. Supp. at 168.
121. Id. at 169.
122. Id. at 168-69.
123. Id. at 169.
124. Id.
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v. Hitchcock it has been a clear principle of Federal Indian law
that Congress has the plenary power to dispose of Indian land,
subject only to the limitations imposed by the Fifth Amendment.
We then demonstrated that Congress could settle the Navajo-Hopi
land controversy in a manner other than through the expulsion
of thousands of Navajos from their homes and that there is no
valid reason of public policy for choosing the expulsion option over
other available solutions. It is now necessary to consider whether,
given the circumstances of this case, the plenary powers of Congress
would allow Congress to pass a Navajo expulsion bill or whether
the limitation on Congressional power imposed by the Fifth Amend-
ment would invalidate such action.
What must be kept in mind is that it has been held that in
1931 the Navajo Indians were legally settled by the Federal Govern-
ment on the land here in issue, that Congress had the freedom
to deal with that land as it wished until 1958 and that it then
conveyed joint, undivided and equal rights in the land to both the
Navajo Tribe and the Hopi Tribe. Can Congress against this back-
ground now compel a partition which would cause thousands of
Navajos to be evicted from their homes?
Before answering this question it would be appropriate to exam-
ine two laws in which Congress dealt with a problem quite similar
to the Navajo-Hopi dispute. In both of these instances the landown-
ers' interest was, as here, an Indian interest. The settlers in these
cases, however, were non-Indians. That appears to have been the
crucial point of difference, for in both instances there never was
any doubt that the landowners' interest would be recognized in
cash rather than in land.
The first law referred to is the Pueblo Lands Act of 1924.122
Eleven years before the enactment of that law, the Supreme Court
of the United Sates had rendered a decision, United States v. San-
doval,12e the logical consequence of which was that persons who
had settled on the land of the Indian Pueblos of New Mexico were
mere squatters and were thus subject to eviction. 127 This decision
had created a great deal of consternation throughout New Mexico
and had caused the New Mexico delegation in Congress to sponsor
bills designed to secure the rights of the non-Indian settlers to
125. Act of June 7, 1924, ch. 391, 43 Stat. 636.
126. 231 U.S. 28 (1913).
127. In the .Sandoval case the Supreme Court held that "long-continued legislative and
executive usage and an unbroken current of judicial decisions have attributed to the United
States . . . the power and the duty of exercising a fostering care and protection over all
dependent Indian communities within its borders .... " Id. at 46. Non-Indians who had
settled on lands belonging to Indian Pueblos feared that the principle of Federal guardian-
ship established by the Sandoval case would be used as the basis for evicting them. The
concerns of the non-Indian settlers were not unwarranted, because ultimately the Federal
government did so employ the Sandoval holding. See United States v. Candeleria, 271 U.S.
432 (1926).
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the land which they were using and occupying. 12 The resultant
legislation, the Pueblo Lands Act of 1924, provided that any settler
who had used Pueblo land for twenty-two years under color of
title or for thirty-five years without color of title could remain
there and have title to the land quieted in him. 129 The United States,
in turn, would compensate the Indian Pueblo for its loss of land.130
That the primary purposes of the Pueblo Lands Act was to
spare non-Indian settlers the hardship of forced expulsion from their
homes clearly is demonstrated by the legislative history of the Act.
As one of the witnesses before a Congressional committee observed:
[I]f the Government is correct in its contention that . . .
[the settlers] can not urge a defense under [the New Mex-
ico] adverse statute as against the Government, I think that
in many, many instances settlers will come off the land when
they should not. 81
In agreeing with this statement, the then Congressman Hayden in-
dicated:
[T]he impression I gained . . . is corroborated by what you
have just stated. Undoubtedly there are some people who
have lived there long enough and have done the things they
ought to have done who should obtain title to lands on which
the [sic] reside or occupy. . . . But if nothing is done ...
undoubtedly every occupant will be thrown off the land as a
trespasser, and that would do great injustice in many in-
stances. It was the view of the committee . . . that there
should be legislation passed by Congress to do justice to the
Pueblos and at the same time do justice to people residing
within the limits of the grants, who also ought to be pro-
tected.182
The attorney representing the non-Indian settlers also offered
testimony which emphasized the rationale for the compensation ap-
proach:
There is a serious question as to whether or not all of [the
titles of the non-Indian settlers] are fundamentally good ...
Thus we find ourselves in this turmoil and in this trouble;
thus it happens that four suits have been brought in the
United States District Court for the ousting of the occupants
of tracts of land numbering about 600, affecting people to the
number of about 1,200 men, women and children. There are
128. See F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAx LAW 389-90 (1942).
129. Act of June 7, 1924, ch. 331, § 4, 43 Stat. 636, 637.
130. Act of June 7, 1924, ch. 331, § 6, 43 Stat. 637-38.
131. Hearings on H.R. 13674 and H.R. 13452 Before the House Comm. on Indian A/lairs,
67th Cong., 4th Sess. 20 (1923).
132. Ird. at 21.
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only 4 grants involved in those suits and there are some 16
other grants yet to be brought under the same form of attack.
Thus you can see our trouble. . . . [T]hese people . . . shall
be ousted from the possession of the lands which they and
their ancestors have, in many instances, occupied for more
than 300 years. There is the practical condition with which
we are faced. 133
In the Pueblo Lands Act Congress clearly detailed the manner
in which it would approach Indian land questions which were com-
plicated by the presence of non-Indian settlers on part of the Indian
tribe's land. Congress indicated that it would compensate the Indian
tribe for its interest in the land rather than require the removal
at great human cost of the non-Indian settlers.
Congress recently has emphasized the continuing validity of the
compensation approach in the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
of 1971.134 Section 4 of the Act provided that:
[a]l1 claims [of Alaska Natives] against the United
States, the State, and all other persons that are based on
claims of aboriginal right, title, use or occupancy of land or
water area in Alaska, or that are based on any statute or
treaty of the United States relating to Native use and occu-
pancy, or that are based on the laws of any other nation,
including any such claims that are pending before any Fed-
eral or state court or the Indian Claims Commission are
hereby extinguished. 13 5
Section 6 of the Act detailed the monetary settlement which the
Alaska Natives would receive as a result of the extinguishment
of their claims. 136
In addition to the compensation fund established by Section 6
the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act allowed the various Native
corporations established by the Act to select land from certain desig-
nated areas, but here again Congress evidenced a clearly expressed
intent not to permit such selections to result in the forced relocation
of non-Native settlers. Section 14 of the Act provided the following:
[E]ach patent issued [to a Native corporation] . . . shall
be subject to the requirements of this subsection. Upon re-
ceipt of a patent or patents:
(1) the Village Corporation shall first convey to any... non-
133. Id. at 286.
134. Act of December 18, 1971, 85 Stat. 688. During the period between the Pueblo Lands
Act and the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act Congress also employed the compensa-
tion approach in the Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946 and the Ute Jurisdictional Act
of 1938. See generally Act of August 13, 1946, ch. 959, 60 Stat. 1049; 25 U.S.C. §§ 70 et seq.(1970) ; S. REP. No. 1715, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946) ; H.R. REP. No. 1466, 79th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1945) ; Act of June 28, 1938, ch. 776, 54 Stat. 1209.
135. Act of December 18, 1971, 85 Stat. at 689,
136. Id.
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Native occupant, without consideration, title to the sur-
face estate in the tract occupied as a primary place of
residence, or as a primary place of business, or as head-
quarters for reindeer husbandry .... 137
The legislative history of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement
Act reveals the rationale for the protective provision in Section
14. The Secretary of the Interior explained that the general purpose
of the Act was to extinguish the Native claims
in a way that would make it a final act, in a way that would
be fair to the non-Native as well as to the Native so that the
non-Native would have no cloud on his title .... 188
Thus, the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act confirmed the
approach which Congress had used in the Pueblo Lands Act of 1924.
The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act was based primarily on
the compensation approach. Even where the Act did provide for
the patenting of land to Native corporations, it nevertheless guaran-
teed that the land selection program would not require non-Natives
to abandon their homes and businesses.
The enactment by Congress of a bill to partition the joint-interest
area and expel Navajo residents represents a sharp departure from
the approach employed in legislation such as the Pueblo Lands
Act and the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. Congress would
be imposing a burden on the members of the Navajo Tribe which
in similar circumstances it has not seen fit to impose on non-Indians.
Such action would raise a serious question of invidious racial dis-
crimination in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 18 9
137. Id. at 691.
138. Hearings on H.R. 3100, H.R. 7039, and H.R. 7432 Before the Subcorm. on Indian
Affairs of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1971).
The point was made even more explicitly in an exchange between a member of
the House Committee on Indian Affairs and the Presidnt of the Alaska Federation of Na-
tives:
Mr. Steiger.... It is not your intention, as I understand it in your bill, to
claim lands which are presently patented by individuals who are nonpolitical
entities. Is that correct?
Mr. Wright. That is correct. That is the compensation portion of the bill.
Mr. Steiger. I will refer specifically to a narrow group, the non-Native in
the process of perfecting a homestead under the law, In what position does he
lie with reference to your acquisition of these lands?
Mr. Wright. We have discussed that at length with State officials and among
ourselves and it is our intent to accommodate those.
Mr. Steiger. You do agree, and of course this is one reason why I am pur-
suing this line because it is left as a judgment matter. You do agree that the
non-Indian who has pursued an acquisition of title in good faith under the law
Is entitled to at least as much protection as a Native in acquiring these lands.
Is that a good statement?
Mr. Wright. That is a good statement.
Hearings on H.R. 3100, H.R. 7039, and H.R. 7432 Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs
of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 240 (1971).
139. States are prohibited from engaging in invidious racial discriminatiqit by the equal
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Courts have found invidious racial "discrimination in a variety
of contexts. 140 The most obvious example is where governmental
action uses a classification based explicitly on race.1 4 1 Governmental
action which is not explicitly based on race, but which does -evidence
a manifest purpose to exclude or otherwise burden a racial group,
also constitutes invidious racial discrimination.1 42 Finally, govern-
mental action which neither explicitly nor implicitly is designed
to discriminate against a racial group nevertheless violates the Con-
stitution if its effect is felt primarily by .one racial group. 
1 4
The proposed Navajo expulsion bills fall into at least the third
and probably the second and third categories of invidious racial
discrimination. A comparison of the Pueblo Lands Act, the Alaska
Native Claims Act, and the proposed expulsion bills indicates no
significant difference in the respective fact situations except the
race of the persons who have settled on land in which an Indian
tribe has an interest. Congress justified the compensation approach
in the Pueblo Lands Act and the Alaska Native Claims Settlement
Act on the ground that any other approach would require non-Indian
settlers to abandon homes and businesses in which they had a
legitimate stake. As the Healing opinion itself recognized, the Navajo
Tribe's right to reside in the joint-interest area was established
formally when the Secretary of the Interior "settled" the Tribe
in the Executive Order Reservation in 1931. Members of the Navajo
Tribe therefore also have a legitimate stake in not being forced
at this late date to abandon their homes.
The conclusion that the governmental action in the expulsion
bills is based on an invidious racial classification gains additional
support from the legislative history of the most recent such bill.
One of the Congressmen who advocated the expulsion approach-
the same Congressman who in the Alaska context was most solicitous
of the welfare of non-Indian settlers, Mr. Sam Steiger-was asked
why Congress should not adopt the approach used in similar situ-
ations involving non-Indian settlers. In response to the question,
Congressman Steiger offered the following explanation:
I would simply tell the gentleman that the distinction between
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, but courts have held
that this same "admonition is applicable to the federal government through the Fifth
Amendment." United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1973).
140. Most of the cases cited In this section of the article involve judicial interpretations of
the constitutional requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Fifth Amend-
ment. However, in recent years courts have applied the same equal protection standards to
both State and Federal action. See, eg., United States v. Moreno, 418 U.S. 528 (1973).
Thus, Fourteenth Amendment cases are Instructive in determining whether Federal action
amounts to invidious discrimination in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
141. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
142. See, e.g., Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85 (1955).
143. See Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972) ; Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437
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that situation and this one is that in those instances, everyone
of those instances, we are dealing with non-Indians occupying,
and believing they have a right in the lands. Here, we are
dealing with two tribes. This is the distinction. 14 4
Thus, the expulsion bills discriminate against members of the Navajo
Tribe, and according to the legislative history of the most recent
expulsion bill, do so on the basis of race.
The law is settled beyond dispute that a classification based
upon race must be subjected to a rigorous standard of review.
Such classifications are considered to be "constitutionally suspect"'145
and must be subjected to "most rigid scrutiny."' 14 In order to pass
constitutional muster whatever racial discrimination flows from the
government's conduct - whether in its purpose or its effect -
must be necessary to achieve a valid public goal.247 On the facts
of this case, this requirement cannot be met. As has already been
shown, the only appropriate public-policy goal, to deliver to the
Hopi Tribe the full benefits of its co-ownership of the joint-interest
area can be reached without expelling a single Navajo family from
its home.
Thus, the expulsion approach represents invidious discrimination
in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. It embodies
a dramatic departure from the method Congress has used in the
past to resolve situations in which an Indian tribe holds title to
land that over a period of time has been settled by non-Indians.
More important, the expulsion bills themselves and their legislative
history demonstrate that the change in approach is based on a
racial classification which is not necessary for the achievement
of a legitimate public purpose. Under these circumstances the ex-
pulsion bills are constitutionally defective.
VI. CONCLUSION
As these lines are being written, the outcome of the Navajo-Hopi
legislative struggle in the 93rd Congress is in doubt. The House
has passed the Hopi-sponsored expulsion bill. The Senate Committee
on Interior and Insular Affairs has approved a substitute under
which the parties would enter into negotiations and if these negoti-
ations fail, the Federal District Court would have power to allocate
the interests of the Tribes under standards which would take the
F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971) ; Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 P.2d 920
(2d Cir. 1968).
144. H.R. 10337, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (Unpublished record of mark-up session of Dec. 11,
1973).
145. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
146. Korematsu v. United States, 328 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
147. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 n.17 (1970).
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human factor as well as property rights into account. Whatever
the ultimate outcome of the legislative struggle, Healing v. Jones
is certain to remain the subject of debate and discussion for years
to come.
